In an Ideal Shortest Path Algorithm (ISPA), at each moment each router in a network sends all of its traffic down the path that will incur the lowest cost to that traffic. In the limit of an infinitesimally small amount of traffic for a particular router, its routing that traffic via an ISPA is optimal, as far as cost incurred by that traffic is concerned. We demonstrate though that in many cases, due to the side-effects of one router's actions on another routers performance, having routers use ISPA's is suboptimal as far as global aggregate cost is concerned, even when only used to route infinitesimally small amounts of traffic. As a particular example of this we present an instance of Braess' paradox for ISPA's, in which adding new links to a network decreases overall throughput. We also demonstrate that load-balancing, in which the routing decisions are made to optimize the global cost incurred by all traffic currently being routed, is suboptimal as far as global cost averaged across time is concerned. This is also due to "side-effects", in this case of current routing decision on future traffic. The theory of COllective INtelligence (COIN) is concerned precisely with the issue of avoiding such deleterious side-effects. We present key concepts from that theory and use them to derive an idealized algorithm whose performance is better than that of the ISPA, even in the infinitesimal limit. We present experiments verifying this, and also showing that a machine-learning-based version of this COIN algorithm in which costs are only imprecisely estimated (a version potentially applicable in the real world) also outperforms the ISPA, despite having access to less information than does the ISPA. In particular, this COIN algorithm avoids Braess' paradox.
INTRODUCTION
The problem of how to control routing across a network underlies a vast array of realworld problems including internet routing, voice/video communication, traffic flows, etc. In its general form, the problem is how to optimize the flow of certain entities (e.g., information packets, cars) from sources to destinations across a network of routing nodes. Here we are concerned with the version of the problem in which "optimization" consists of minimizing aggregate cost incurred by the entities flowing to their destinations. To ground the discussion, we will consider the case where the entities being routed are packets.
Currently, many real-world network routing solutions to this particular problem are based on the Shortest Path Algorithm (SPA), in which each routing node in the network maintains estimates of the "shortest paths" (i.e., minimal total incurred costs) from it to each of its destinations and at each moment satisfies any routing requests by sending all its packets down that shortest path. Many algorithms exist for efficiently computing the shortest path in the case where the costs for traversing each component of every path at any given time are known. In particular, there exist many such algorithms that can be applied when node-to-node path-cost communication is available and the costs for traversing each component are unvarying in time (e.g., Dijkstra's Algorithm [1, 3, 9, 10] . Real-world SPA's apply such algorithms to estimated costs for traversing each component of every path to generate their estimated shortest paths.
Consider the case where for all paths from a particular node to a particular destination, the costs that would be incurred by that node's routing all its current traffic along that path is known exactly to that node (the information being stored in that router's "routing table"). Clearly if a non-infinitesimal amount of traffic is being routed by our node, then in general its sending all that traffic down a single path will not result in minimal cost incurred by that traffic, no matter how that single path is chosen. However if it must choose a single path for all its traffic, then tautologically the SPA chooses the best such path. Accordingly, in the limit of routing an infinitesimally small amount of traffic, with all other nodes' strategies being a "background", such a router's running SPA is the optimal (least aggregate incurred cost) routing strategy for that particular routing node considered individually.
One might hope that more generally, if the node must allot all of its traffic to a single path, then its choosing that path via the SPA would be the globally optimal choice of a single path, at least in the limit of infinitesimally little traffic. This is not the case though, because in using the SPA the node is not concerned with the deleterious side-effects of its actions on the costs to other nodes [15, 26] . In the extreme case, as elaborated below, if all nodes were to try to minimize their personal costs via SPA's, then the nodes would actually all receive higher cost than would be the case under an alternative set of strategies. This is an instance of the famous Tragedy Of the Commons (TOC) [12] .
Deleterious side-effects need not be restricted to extend over space; they can also extend over time. Indeed, consider the algorithm of having all routers at a given moment make routing decisions that optimize global cost incurred by the traffic currently being routed, an algorithm often called "load-balancing" (LB). By definition, LB avoids the deleterious side-effects over space that can result in the TOC for the costs incurred by the traffic currently being routed. However, due to side-effects over time, even conventional LB is often suboptimal as far as global cost averaged across time is concerned. Intuitively, one would have to use "load-balancing over time" to ensure truly optimal performance.
In this paper we are concerned with how to address these kinds of deleterious sideeffects, and thereby improve performance. In particular, we are interested in ways of doing this that result in better performance than that of the ubiquitous SPA. Now use of the SPA obviously provides no guarantees, even for personal cost of the router using it, if the path-estimates of the nodes are incorrect. Such inaccuracy is the rule rather than the exception in many practical applications. Typically those estimates will be in error because node-to-node communication is not instantaneous, and therefore routing tables may be based on out of date information. More generally though, even if that communication were instantaneous, the cost to traverse a component of the network may be different by the time the packet arrives at that component.
In this paper we do not wish to investigate such topics, but rather to highlight the issue of side-effects. Accordingly we "rig the game" in favor of the SPA by constructing our simulations so that the first potential cause of routing table inaccuracy does not arise, and the second is minimized. We do this in our experiments by using an Ideal Shortest Path Algorithm (ISPA) which has direct access to the shortest path at each moment. Note that this ISPA provides an upper bound on the performance of any real-world SPA.
In general, even without side-effects, determining the optimal solution to a flow problem (e.g., determining what the loads on each link need to be to maximize throughput on a non-cooperative data network) can be nontractable [1, 20] . Therefore, we will concern ourselves with providing good solutions that avoid the difficulties the ISPA has with side-effects. It is not our aim here to present algorithms that find the best possible ("load-balanced over time") solution.
We will base our solutions on the concept of Collective Intelligence. A "COllective INtelligence" (COIN) is any pair of a large, distributed collection of interacting goal-driven computational processes among which there is little to no centralized communication or control, together with a 'world utility' function that rates the possible dynamic histories of the collection [26, 25] . In this paper we are particularly concerned with computational processes that use machine learning techniques (e.g., reinforcement learning [14, 23, 22, 24] ) to try to achieve their goal, conventionally represented as maximizing an associated utility function. We consider the central COIN design problem: how, without any detailed modeling of the overall system, can one set utility functions for the individual components in a COIN to have the overall dynamics reliably and robustly achieve large values of the provided world utility? In other words, how can we leverage an assumption that our learners are individually fairly good at what they do? In a routing context, this question reduces to what goals one ought to provide to each router so that each router's greedily pursuing those goals will maximize throughput ("incentive engineering"). For reasons given above, we know that the answer to this question is not provided by SPA's goals -some new set of goals is needed.
In Section 2 we discuss the SPA's deficiencies and in particular their manifestations in Braess' paradox. We also demonstrate the suboptimality of load-balancing in that section. We then present Collective Intelligence in Section 3, discuss the routing model we will use in our experiments, and show how the theory of COINs can be applied to that model to provide an alternative to shortest path algorithms. In Section 4 we present simulation results with that model that demonstrate that in networks running ISPA, the per packet costs can be as much as 32 % higher than in networks running algorithms based on COIN theory. In particular, even though it only has access to imprecise estimates of costs (a handicap that does not hold for ISPA), the COIN-based algorithm almost always avoids Braess' paradox, in stark contrast to the ISPA. In that the cost incurred with ISPA's is presumably a lower bound on that of an SPA not privy to instantaneous communication, the implication is that COINs can outperform such real-world SPA's. 1 
Suboptimality of Shortest Path and Load-Balancing
In this section we first demonstrate the suboptimality of an SPA when we have multiple nodes making simultaneous routing decisions, where neither node knows ahead of time the other's choice, and therefore does not know ahead of time exactly what the costs will be. We then demonstrate that such suboptimality can hold even when only one node is making a decision, and it knows what decisions the others have previously made. Next we present Braess' paradox, a particularly pointed instance of these effects. (See [2, 7, 6, 18] for other discussion of Braess' paradox in SPA routing.) We end by demonstrating the suboptimality of conventional load-balancing when cost over time is what's of interest.
SPA when multiple routers are simultaneously making decisions
Perhaps the simplest example of how individual greed on the part of all nodes can lead to their collective detriment occurs when two nodes determine that their shortest path is through a shared link with a limited capacity, while both have a second option that is slightly less preferable. In such a case, their using the common link degrades the performance of both parties, since due to limited capacity the performance of that link will quickly fall below that of their second option.
More precisely, consider the case where, given a load x, the shared link has a cost given by x 3 , and where each router has a second option where the cost is given by 2x. Acting alone, with a single packet to send, they would both send that packet through 1 A brief synopsis of the COIN algorithm discussed here was presented in a space-constrained article [26] ; this paper presents full details and applies the algorithm to Braess' paradox as an illustration of the suboptimality of the SPA.
the shared link (cost of 1). However by both doing so, they incur a larger cost (cost of 8) than if they had both used their second choice (cost of 4). Without knowing what each other will do ahead of time (information not conventionally contained in routing tables), the nodes will necessarily have mistaken cost estimates and therefore make incorrect routing decisions. (Indeed, to have all nodes know what each other are doing ahead of time requires the use of game theory.) In this, even in the limit of differentially small packets, use of SPA will lead to a wrong routing decision.
SPA when only one router is making a decision
Consider the network shown in Figure 1 . Two source routers X and Y each send one packet at a time, with X sending to either intermediate router A or B, and Y sending to either B or C. This type of network may arise in many different topologies as a subnetwork. Accordingly, difficulties associated with this network can also apply to many more complex topologies. Figure 1 : Independent decisions at the source Let x A , x B , y B , and y C , be the packet quantities at a particular fixed time t, at A, B, or C, and originating from X or Y , as indicated. At t, each source has one packet to send. So each of our variables is binary, with x A + x B = y B + y C = 1. Have V i (z i ) be the cost, per packet, at the single instant t, at router i, when the total number of packets at that instant on that router is z i . So the total cost incurred by all packets at the time t, G( x, y), equals
In an ISPA, X chooses which of x A or x B = 1 so as to minimize the cost incurred by X's packet alone,
. (Real-world SPA's typically try to approximate this by having X choose either A or B according to whether V A (0) or V B (y B ) is smaller, where those two values can be estimated via pings, for example.) In doing this the ISPA ignores the y B V B (x B + y B ) term, i.e., it ignores the "side effects" of X's decision.
The right thing to do of course is instead have X minimize G( x, y), or more precisely, the components of G( x, y) that depend on X. Writing it out for this case, X ought to act to minimize x A V A (x A ) + (x B + y B )V B (x B + y B ). Due to the constraint that x A + x B = 1, this means sending down A iff V A (1) < (y B + 1)V B (y B + 1) − y B V B (y B ), which differs from the ISPA result in that X is concerned with the full cost of going through router B, not just the portion of that cost that its packet receives.
In the context of this example, this G-minimizing algorithm constitutes "load-balancing" (LB). Note that so long as sgn [ 
, even in the limit of infinitesimally small traffic (so that x A + x B equals some infinitesimal δ), ISPA and LB still disagree.
Braess' Paradox
Braess' paradox [2, 7, 6, 16, 18] dramatically underscores the inefficiency of the ISPA described above. This apparent "paradox" is perhaps best illustrated through a highway traffic example first given by Bass [2] : There are two highways connecting towns S and D. The cost associated with traversing either highway (either in terms of tolls, or delays) is V 1 + V 2 , as illustrated in Net A of Figure 2 . So when x = 1 (a single traveler) for either path, total accrued cost is 61 units. If on the other hand, six travelers are split equally among the two paths, they will each incur a cost of 83 units to get to their destinations. Now, suppose a new highway is built connecting the two branches, as shown in Net B in Figure 2 . Further, note that the cost associated with taking this highway is not particularly high (in fact for any load higher than 1, this highway has a lower cost than any other highway in the system). The benefit of this highway is illustrated by the dramatically reduced cost incurred by the single traveler: by taking the short-cut, one traveler can traverse the network at a cost of 31 units (2 V 1 + V 3 ). Adding a new road has seemingly reduced the traversal cost dramatically. However consider what happens when six travelers are on the highways in net B. If each node uses an ISPA, then at equilibrium each of the three possible paths contains two travelers. 2 Due to overlaps in the paths however, this results in each traveler incurring a cost of 92 units, which is higher than than what they incurred before the new highway was built. The net effect of adding a new road is to increase the cost incurred by every traveler. This phenomenon is known as Braess' paradox.
The Suboptimality of Load-Balancing
As mentioned before, LB considers side-effects of current routing decisions on other traffic currently being routed. However because it does not consider side-effects of routing decisions on future traffic, even LB may not optimize global cost averaged across all time, depending on the details of the system. Here we present an existence proof of this, by explicitly constructing a situation where conventional LB is suboptimal.
Consider a system with discrete time, in which the node X under consideration must route one packet to the (fixed) destination at each time step (cf. Section 2.2 above). Presume further that no traffic enters any of the nodes X sends to except for X. (So that traffic coming from X is the sole source of any costs associated with X's outbound links.) Let S(t) be the number of times our node sent a packet down some link A in the W time steps preceding t, and take s(t) = A, B to mean that the router uses link A or B, respectively, at time t. Model queue backups and the like by having the cost to send a packet down link A at time t be C A (S(t)/W ), and have the cost for our router to instead send the packet down link B be C B (1 − S(t)/W ), For simplicity we assume that both C A (.) and C B (.) are monotonically increasing functions of their arguments.
Restrict attention to nodes that work by having s(t) = A iff S(t) ≤ k for some real-valued threshold k. The LB algorithm will choose s(t) = A iff C A (S(t)/W ) ≤ C B (1 − S(t)/W ). So the LB algorithm's behavior is indistinguishable from this kind of threshold algorithm, with k set so that C A (k/W ) = C B (1 − k/W ). (We implicitly assume that C A (.) and C B (.) are chosen so that such a solution exists for 1 < k < W −1.)
The question is what k should be to optimize total averaged cost across time, and in particular if that k is the same as k LB , the k that LB uses. Now as we go from one time step to the next, the routing decision made W time steps ago drops out of the computation of S(t), while the routing decision just made is newly included. In general, S(t + 1) = S(t) + 1 if the router just used A at time t and used link B at the time W time steps into the past. On the other hand, S(t + 1) = S(t) − 1 if the router just used B and used A W time steps ago, while S(t + 1) = S(t) if the routing decision just made is the same as the routing decision W time steps ago. So in general, S(t) can only change by -1, 0, or +1 as we go from one time step to the next.
Consider cases where 1 < k < W − 1, so that eventually the router must choose an A, and at some subsequent time t * the router switches from A to B. At that time s(t * − 1) = A and s(t * ) = B. This implies that S(t * − 1) ≤ k, S(t * ) > k. Define the value S(t * − 1) as k * . Note that S(t * ) = k * + 1, and k − 1 < k * ≤ k.
router) can gain advantage by changing strategies. Now for any time t ′ , if S(t ′ ) = k * + 1, s(t ′ + 1) = B, and the only possible next values are S(t ′ + 1) = k * or S(t ′ + 1) = k * + 1, depending on the old decision s(t − W ) that gets dropped out of the window. Similarly, if S(t ′ ) = k * , s(t ′ + 1) = A, and the only possible next values are S(t ′ + 1) = k * or S(t ′ + 1) = k * + 1, again depending on the old decision being dropped. So we see that once S(t ′ ) ∈ {k * , k * + 1}, it stays there forever.
This means that because of the relationship between k and k * , in any interval of W consecutive time steps subsequent to t * , the number of packets sent along A by router X must be ∈ (k − 1, k + 1]. (Note that it is possible to send k + 1 packets along A, but not k − 1 packets. Therefore the number sent along B must be
Each time that a packet is sent along A the cost incurred is the cost of link A with average traffic level S(t)/W , C A (S(t)/W ). Similarly, each time the link B is chosen, the cost incurred is C B (1 − S(t)/W ). Since S(t) ∈ {k * , k * + 1}, and both C A (.) and C B (.) are monotonically increasing, the cost for sending the packet down link A ∈ (C A ((k − 1)/W ), C A ((k + 1)/W ], and that for sending it down link B is contained in
Now we know that the choice of A must have average frequency (across all time) between k * /W and (k * + 1)/W . Similarly, B will have average frequency between (1 − (k * + 1)/W ) and 1 − k * /W . Accordingly, the average cost is bounded above by
where the first term provides the maximum possible average cost for using link A, while the second term independently provides the maximum possible average cost for using link B. (Note that the actual cost will be lower since the two frequencies in this bound, one for A and one for B, cannot both have the values indicated.) Because k − 1 < k * ≤ k and since 1 −
The optimal k will result in an average cost lower than the minimum over all k of the upper bound on average cost, given in Equation 2. So the average cost for the optimal k is bounded above by the minimum over k of this upper bound. Lable this argmin of Equation 2 k'.
Since other values of k besides k LB result in behavior equivalent to LB, it does not suffice to simply test if k' = k LB . Instead let us evaluate some lower bounds in a similar fashion to how we evaluated upper bounds. Using the average frequencies discussed above, the average cost is bounded below by:
where the first term provides the minimum possible average cost for using link A, while the second term provides the minimum possible average cost for using link B. Again,
is further bounded below by
In particular this bound holds for the average cost of the LB algorithm:
where as before
By appropriate choice of C A (.) and C B (.), we can ensure that the lower bound on the cost with the LB algorithm (Equation 5 evaluated with k = k LB ) is higher than the upper bound on the average cost incurred by the optimal algorithm (the minimum over k of Equation 2). 3 That is, the best possible average cost achieve by load balancing will be worse than the worst average cost that could arise through the optimal routing strategy. This establishes that LB does not engage in optimal routing.
COIN-based Routing
One common solution to these types of side-effect problems is to have particular components of the network (e.g., a "network manager" [17] ) dictate certain choices to other nodes. This solution can incur major brittleness and scaling problems however. Another kind of approach, which avoids the problems of a centralized manager, is to provide the nodes with extra incentives that can induce them to take actions that are undesirable to them from a strict SPA sense. Such incentive can be in the form of "taxes" or "tolls" added to the costs associated with traversing particular links to discourage the use of those links. Such schemes in which tolls are superimposed on the nodes' goals are a special case of the more general approach of replacing the goal of each node with a new goal. These new goals are specifically tailored so that if they are collectively met the system maximizes throughput. A priori, a node's goal need have no particular relation with the SPA-type cost incurred by that node's packets. Intuitively, in this approach, we provide each node with a goal that is "aligned" with the global objective, with no separate concern for of that goal's relation to the SPA-type cost incurred by the traffic routed by that node.
In this section, we first summarize the theory of such systems, which are called COllective INtelligences (COIN's) [27, 25] . We then use that theory to justify an algorithm 3 For example, for CA(x) = x 2 and CB(x) = x, balancing the loads on A and B -setting 
The COIN Formalism
In this paper we consider systems that consist of a set of nodes, connected in a network, evolving across a set of discrete, consecutive time steps, t ∈ {0, 1, ...}. Without loss of generality, we let all relevant characteristics of a node η at time t -including its internal parameters at that time as well as its externally visible actions -be encapsulated by a Euclidean vector ζ η,t with components ζ η,t;i . We call this the "state" of node η at time t, and let ζ ,t be the state of all nodes at time t, while ζ is the state of all node across all time.
World utility, G(ζ), is a function of the state of all nodes across all time. (Note that that state is a Euclidean vector.) When η is an agent that uses a machine learning (ML) algorithm to "try to increase" its private utility, we write that private utility as g η (ζ), or more generally, to allow that utility to vary in time, g η,τ (ζ).
We assume that ζ encompasses all physically relevant variables, so that the dynamics of the system is deterministic (though of course imprecisely known to anyone trying to control the system). Note that this means that all characteristics of an agent η at t = 0 that affects the ensuing dynamics of the system must be included in ζ η,0 . For ML-based agents, this includes in particular the algorithmic specification of its private utility, typically in the physical form of some computer code. (As elaborated in [25] the mathematics can be generalized beyond ML-based agents.)
Here we focus on the case where our goal, as COIN designers, is to maximize world utility through the proper selection of private utility functions. Intuitively, the idea is to choose private utilities that are aligned with the world utility, and that also have the property that it is relatively easy for us to configure each node so that the associated private utility achieves a large value. In this paper, we restrict attention to utilities of the form t≥τ R t (ζ ,t ) for reward functions R t (simply t R t (ζ ,t ) for non-time-varying utilities). From now on, we will only consider world utilities whose associated set of {R t } are all time-translations of one another. In particular, as shown below, overall network throughput is expressible this way.
We need a formal definition of the concept of having private utilities be "aligned" with G. Constructing such a formalization is a subtle exercise. For example, consider systems where the world utility is the sum of the private utilities of the individual nodes. This might seem a reasonable candidate for an example of "aligned" utilities. However such systems are examples of the more general class of systems that are "weakly trivial".
It is well-known that in weakly trivial systems each individual agent greedily trying to maximize its own utility can lead to the tragedy of the commons [12, 8] and actually minimize G. In particular, this can be the case when private utilities are independent of time and G = η g η . Evidently, at a minimum, having G = η g η is not sufficient to ensure that we have "aligned" utilities; some alternative formalization of the concept is needed. 4 A more careful alternative formalization of the notion of aligned utilities is the concept of "factored" systems. A system is factored at time τ when the following holds for each agent η individually: A change at time τ to the state of η alone, when propagated across time, will result in an increased value of g η,τ (ζ) if and only if it results in an increase for G(ζ) [25] .
For a factored system, the side-effects of a change to η's t = τ state that increases its private utility cannot decrease world utility. There are no restrictions though on the effects of that change on the private utilities of other nodes and/or times. In particular, we don't preclude different a node's algorithm at two different times from "working at cross-purposes" to each other, so long as at both moments the node is working to improve G. In game-theoretic terms, optimal global behavior corresponds to the agents' reaching a private utility Nash equilibrium for such systems [11] . In this sense, there can be no TOC for a factored system. As a trivial example, a system is factored for g η,τ = G ∀η.
Define the effect set of the node-time pair (η, τ ) at ζ, C ef f (η,τ ) (ζ), as the set of all components ζ η ′ ,t which under the forward dynamics of the system have non-zero partial derivative with respect to the state of node η at t = τ . Intuitively, (η, τ )'s effect set is the set of all components ζ η ′ ,t≥τ which would be affected by a change in the state of node η at time τ . (They may or may not be affected by changes in the t = τ states of the other nodes.)
Next, for any set σ of components (η ′ , t), define CL σ (ζ) as the "virtual" vector formed by clamping the σ-components of ζ to an arbitrary fixed value. (In this paper, we take that fixed value to be 0 for all components listed in σ.) The value of the effect set wonderful life utility (WLU for short) for σ is defined as:
In particular, we are interested in the WLU for the effect set of node-time pair (η, τ ). This WLU is the difference between the actual world utility and the virtual world utility where all node-time pairs that are affected by (η, τ ) have been clamped to a zero state while the rest of ζ is left unchanged.
Since we are clamping to 0, we can view (η, τ )'s effect set WLU as analogous to the change in world utility that would have arisen if (η, τ ) "had never existed". (Hence the name of this utility -cf. the Frank Capra movie.) Note however, that CL is a purely "fictional", counter-factual operator, in the sense that it produces a new ζ without taking into account the system's dynamics. The sequence of states the node-time pairs in σ are clamped to in constructing the WLU need not be consistent with the dynamical laws of the system. This dynamics-independence is a crucial strength of the WLU. It means that to evaluate the WLU we do not try to infer how the system would have evolved if node η's state were set to 0 at time τ and the system evolved from there. So long as we know ζ extending over all time, and so long as we know G, we know the value of WLU.
Assuming our system is factored with respect to private utilities {g η,τ }, we want each node to be in a state at time τ that induces as high a value of the associated private utility as possible (given the initial states of the other nodes). Assume η is ML-based and able to achieve fairly large values of most private utilities we are likely to set it for time τ , i.e., assume that given that private utility g η,τ , the rest of the components of ζ η,τ are set by η's algorithm in such a way so as to achieve a relatively high value of g η,τ . So our problem becomes determining for what {g η,τ } the nodes will best be able to achieve high g η (subject to each other's actions) while also causing dynamics that is factored for G and the {g η,τ }.
As mentioned above, regardless of the system dynamics, having g η,τ = G ∀η means the system is factored at time τ . It is also true that regardless of the dynamics,
∀η is a factored system at time τ (proof in [25] ). Which of these two choices of the {g η,τ } should we use?
To answer this, note that since each agent is operating in a large system, it may experience difficulty discerning the effects of its actions on G when G sensitively depends on all the myriad components of the system. Therefore each η may have difficulty learning from past experience what to do to achieve high g η,τ when g η,τ = G. 5 This problem can be mitigated by using effect set WLU as the private utility, since the subtraction of the clamped term removes much of the "noise" of the activity of other agents, leaving only the underlying "signal" of how the agent in question affects the utility. (This reasoning is formalized as the concept of "learnability" in [25] .) Accordingly, one would expect that setting private utilities to WLU's ought to result in better performance than having g η,τ = G ∀η, τ . In practice, we will often only be able to estimate the "primary", most prominent portion of the effect set. However assuming that the associated WLU is close enough to being factored, we would expect the advantage in learnability with such a WLU to still result in better performance than would using g η,τ = G ∀η, τ . (See [27, 25] .) Indeed, for the sake of improving learnability, often 5 In particular, in the routing problem, having private rewards given by the world reward functions means that to provide each router with its reward at each time step we need to provide it the full throughput of the entire network at that step. This is usually infeasible in practice. Even if it weren't though, using these private utilities would mean that the routers face a very difficult task in trying to discern the effect of their actions on their rewards, and therefore would likely be unable to learn their best routing strategies.
we will elect to exclude certain node-time pairs from our estimate of the effect set of (η, τ ), even if we are sure that that are affected by ζ η,τ . This will be the case if we expect that the changes in G due to varying ζ η,τ that are "mediated" through those node-time pairs are relatively insignificant, and therefore effectively constitute noise for the learning process, so that their effect on learnability is more important than their effect on factoredness.
Model Description
To apply the COIN formalism to a network routing model, we must formally identify the components of that model as deterministically evolving vectors ζ ,t . In the model used in this paper, at any time step all traffic at a router is a set of pairs of integer-valued traffic amounts and associated ultimate destination tags. At each such time step t, each router r sums the integer-valued components of its current traffic at that time step to get its instantaneous load. We write that load as z r (t) ≡ d x r,d (t), where the index d runs over ultimate destinations, and x r,d (t) is the total traffic at time t going from r towards d. After its instantaneous load at time t is evaluated, the router sends all its traffic to the next downstream routers, in a manner governed by its routing algorithm. We indicate such "next routers" by writing x r,d (t) = r ′ x r,d,r ′ (t) where r ′ is the first stop on the path to be followed from router r to ultimate destination d. After all such routed traffic goes to those next downstream routers, the cycle repeats itself, until all traffic reaches its destinations.
In our simulations, for simplicity, traffic was only introduced into the system (at the source routers) at the beginning of successive waves of L consecutive time steps. (L was always chosen to be the minimal number necessary for all traffic to reach its destination before the next wave of traffic is initiated.) We use κ(t) to indicate either the integer-valued wave number associated with time t or the set of all times in that wave, as the context indicates.
In a real network, the cost of traversing a router does not change dramatically from one packet to the next. To simulate this effect, we use time-averaged values of the load at a router rather than instantaneous load to determine the cost a packet incurs in traversing that router. More formally, we define the router's windowed load, Z r (t), as the running average of that router's load value over a window of the previous W timesteps:
, where the value of X r,d (t) is set by the dynamical law X r,d (t) = 1 W t t ′ =t−W +1 x r,d (t ′ )). (W is always set to an integer multiple of L.) For large enough W , using such a window means that in a typical scenario the costs across nodes will only change substantially over time scales significantly larger than that of the individual routing decisions. The windowed load is the argument to a load-to-cost function, V (·), which provides the cost accrued at time t by each packet traversing the router at this timestep. That is, at time t, the cost for each packet to traverse router r is given by V (Z r (t)). 6 (We also introduce "dummy nodes" denoted by V 0 (·) = 0 which help in translating the mathematics into the simulations. Omitting them will have no effect on the simulations.) Different routers have different V (·), to reflect the fact that real networks have differences in router software and hardware (response time, queue length, processing speed etc). For simplicity, W is the same for all routers however. With these definitions, world utility is given by
Our equation for G explicitly demonstrates that, as claimed above, in our representation we can express G(ζ) as a sum of rewards, t R t (ζ ,t ), where R(ζ ,t ) can be written as function of a pair of (r, d)-indexed vectors:
Also as claimed, the R t are temporal translations of one another.
Given this model, some of the components of ζ ,t must be identified with the values x r,d,r ′ (t) ∀ r, d, r ′ and t, since those are the actions we will take. Since all arguments of G must be components of ζ, we also include the X r,d (t) ∀r, d, t as components of ζ ,t . (We could use the {Z r (t)} as an alternative, but this would provide a "coarser" WLU; see below.) Formally, for routing based on ML agents, other variables must also be included in ζ, to capture the (deterministically evolving) internal parameters used by those agents to make their routing decisions. We won't have any need to explicitly delineate such variables here however, and will mostly phrase the discussion as though there were no such internal parameters.
Now the values {x r,d,r ′ (t − 1)} ∀r, d, r ′ specify the values {x r,d (t)} ∀r, d directly. However the decisions of each router's algorithm at all times t is a fixed function of the {x r,d (t − 1)} and the {Z r (t − 1) = d ′ X r,d ′ (t − 1)}, a function given by the routing algorithm which is implicitly encapsulated in the dynamical laws governing the system. So in point of fact we can map the set of {x r,d,r ′ (t − 1)} ∀r, d, r ′ to the full set {x r,d,r ′ (t)} ∀r, d, r ′ , not just to {x r,d (t)}. Accordingly, the x r,d,r ′ undergo deterministic evolution. Since their values across time set all the values of the X r,d (t) across time, we see that the entire set of the components of ζ ,t undergo deterministic evolution in this representation, as required.
For evaluating the wonderful life utility we will need to group the components of ζ ,t into disjoint nodes η. Here we will have two types of node, both types being indexed by router-destination pairs. For each such node index (r, d), the first node type is the variable X r,d (t), and the second node type is the Euclidean vector with components indexed by r ′ , (x r,d ) r ′ (t). In setting "actions" we are concerned with setting the states of the nodes of the second type. Accordingly, our learners will all be associated with nodes of this second type. Unless explicitly indicated otherwise, from now on we will implicitly have that second type of node in mind whenever we refer to a "node" or use the symbol η.
At time step t, ISPA has access to all the windowed loads at time step t − 1 (i.e., it has access to Z r (t − 1) ∀r), and assumes that those values will remain the same at all times ≥ t. (Note that for large window sizes and times close to t, this assumption is arbitrarily accurate.) Using this assumption, in ISPA, each router sends packets along the path that it calculates will minimize the costs accumulated by its packets.
COIN Routing
Based on the COIN formalism presented in Section 3.1 and the model described above, we now present the COIN-based routing algorithms.
To evaluate the WLU for a node (r, d) at any time τ , we must estimate the (primary members of the) associated effect set. This means determining what components of ζ , will, under the dynamics of the system, be changed by altering any of the components of the vector x r,d (τ ).
As a first approximation, we will ignore effects that changing x r,d (τ ) may have that are "mediated" by the learning algorithms running in the system. That is, we ignore changes that arise due to the the effects of changing x r,d (τ ) on rewards, changes which induce changes in future training sets, which then in turn get mapped to changes in the {x r,d,r ′ (t)} (and therefore the {X r,d (t)}) via the learning algorithms running on the nodes.
As another approximation, we will ignore effects mediated by the routing algorithms' observations of the state of the network. That is, we ignore changes in the {x r ′′ ,d ′ ,r ′′′ (t)} that varying x r,d (τ ) may cause due to (r ′′ , d ′ )'s routing algorithm perceiving a different state of the network and modifying its routing decisions accordingly. We only consider the behavior of those routing algorithms that are (potentially) directly affected by x r,d (τ ) in that they (potentially) have to route packets that, at time τ , passed through r on the way to d. So in particular we ignore effects of x r,d (τ ) on the {x r ′′ ,d ′ =d,r ′′′ (t).
Since all packets routed in a wave arrive at their destinations by the end of the wave, these approximations mean that the only x r ′′ ,d ′′ ,r ′′′ (t) that are in our estimate for x r,d (τ )'s effect set have t in the same wave as τ . (These are the only ones that are, potentially, directly affected by the {x r,d,r ′ (t)} by "chaining together" the sequence of x r ′′ ,d ′′ ,r ′′′ (t) that get the packets in x r,d (t) to their ultimate destination.) Due to the wave nature of our simulations though, the only x r ′′ ,d ′′ ,r ′′′ (t) within τ 's wave that are affected by x r,d (τ ) all have d ′′ = d. For reasons of coding simplicity, we do not concern ourselves whether t < τ within a given wave and then exclude some x r ′′ ,d ′′ ,r ′′′ (t) accordingly. In other words, all t within τ 's wave are treated equally.
So one set of members of x r,d (τ )'s effect set is {x r ′′ ,d,r ′′′ (t) ∀r ′′ , d, r ′′′ , t ∈ κ(τ )}. Note that some of these members will be relatively unaffected by x r,d (τ ) (e.g., those with r ′′ far in the net away from r). Again for simplicity, we do not try to determine these and exclude them. As with keeping the x r ′′ ,d,r ′′′ (t < τ ), this inclusion of extra nodes in our estimate of the effect set should hurt learnability, but in general should not hurt factoredness. Therefore it should delay how quickly the learners determine their optimal policies, but it won't affect how the quality (for G) of those polices finally arrived at. Note also that trying to determine whether some particular x r ′′ ,d,r ′′′ (t ∈ κ(τ )) should be included in x r,d (τ )'s effect set would mean, in part, determining whether packets routed from (r, d) would have reached r ′′ if (r, d) had made some routing decision different from the one it actually made. This would be a non-trivial exercise, in general.
In contrast to the case with the x r ′′ ,d ′ ,r ′′′ (t), there are X r ′′ ,d ′ (t) with t in the future of τ 's wave that both are affected by x r,d (t) and also are not excluded by any of our approximations so far. In particular, the X r ′′ ,d (t) with either r ′′ = r or r ′′ one hop away from r will be directly affected by x r,d (t), for t ∈ ∪ W −1 i=0 κ(τ + iL)) (cf. the definition of the X variables). For simplicity, we restrict consideration of such X r ′′ ,d variables to those with the same router as r, r ′′ = r.
This final estimate for the effect set is clearly rather poor -presumably results better than those presented below would accrue to use of a more accurate effect set. However it's worth bearing in mind that there is a "self-stabilizing" nature to the choice of effect sets, when used in conjunction with effect set WLU's. This nature is mediated by the learning algorithms. If I take two nodes and give them the same utility function, then the reward one node gets will be determined in part by what the other one does. So as it modifies its behavior to try to increase its reward, that first node will be modifying its behavior in a way dependent on what the other node does. In other words, if two nodes are given the same WLU because they are estimated to be in each other's effect set, then ipso facto they will be in each other's effect set.
Using our estimate for the effect set, the WLU for (η, τ ) is given by the difference between the total cost accrued in τ 's wave by all nodes in the network and the cost accrued by nodes when all nodes sharing η's destination are "erased." More precisely, any node η that has a destination d will have the following effect set WLU's, g η,τ :
where I(.) is the indicator function that equals 1 if its argument is true, 0 otherwise.
To allow the learner to receive feedback concerning its actions in a wave immediately following that wave rather than wait for ∼ W L time steps, we will approximate the second sum in that last equality, the one over times following τ 's wave, as zero. There is another way we can view the resultant expression, rather than as an approximation to the effect set WLU. That is to view it as the exact WLU of an approximation to the effect set, an approximation which ignores effects on future windowed loads of clamping a current traffic level. Regardless of what view we adopt, presumably better performance could be achieved if we did not implement this approximation.
Given this approximation, our WLU becomes a wave-indexed time-translation-invariant WL "reward function" (WLR):
Notice that traffic going from a router r ′ = r to a destination d ′ = d affects the value of the WLR for node (r, d). This reflects the fact that WLR takes into account side-effects of (r, d)'s actions on other nodes. Note also that each r ′ -indexed term contributing to the WLR can be computed by the associated router r ′ separately, from information available to that router. Subsequently those terms can be propagated through the network to η, in much the same way as routing tables updates are propagated.
Given this choice of private utility, we must next specify how the COIN-based routing algorithm collects the initial data that (in conjunction with this utility) is to be used to guide the initial routing decisions that every node with more than one routing option must make. In our experiments that data was collected during a preliminary running of an ISPA. In this preliminary stage, the routing decisions are made using the ISPA, but the resulting actions are "scored" using the WLR given by Equation 7. 7 The data collected in this stage provides us with initial input-output training sets to be used by the machine learning algorithm on each node: for each router-destination node, inputs are identified with windowed loads on outgoing links, and the associated WLR values for the destination in question are the outputs. 7 We use the ISPA to generate the routing decisions in the initial data since it is likely in practice that some kind of SPA will be the routing algorithm running prior to "turning on" the COIN algorithm. Alternately one can generate the initial data's routing decisions by having the routers make random decisions, or by having them implement a sequence of decisions that "sweeps" across a grid through the possible set of actions.
After sufficient initial data is collected using the ISPA, the system switches to using the COIN algorithm to make subsequent routing decisions. In this stage, each node routes packets along the link that it estimates (based on the training set) would provide the best WLR. To perform the estimation, the MB COIN makes use of a single-nearestneighbor algorithm as its learner. This algorithm simply guesses that the output that would ensue from any candidate input is the same as the output of the element of the training set that is the nearest neighbor (in input space) of that candidate input. 8 In other words, the learner finds the training set input-output pair whose input value (loads on outgoing links) is closest to that which would result from each potential routing decision. Then the learner assigns the WLR associated with that training data pair as the estimate for what WLR would result from said routing decision. These WLR values are then used to choose among those potential routing decisions. The input-output data generated under this algorithm is adding to the training set as it is generated.
In this routing algorithm, the routers only estimate how their routing decisions (as reflected in their loads at individual time steps) will affect their WLR values (based on many nodes' loads). It is also possible to calculate exactly how the routing decisions affect the routers' WLR's if, unlike the MB COIN, we had full knowledge of the loads of all nodes in the system. In a way similar to ISPA, for each router we can evaluate the exact WLR value that would ensue from each of its candidate actions, under the assumption that windowed loads on all other routers are the same one wave into the future as they are now. We call this algorithm for directly maximizing WLR (an algorithm we call the full knowledge COIN (FK COIN)).
Note that under the assumption behind the FK COIN, the action η chooses in wave κ(τ ) that maximizes WLR will also maximize the world reward. In other words, WL reward is perfectly factored with respect to (wave-indexed) world reward, even though the associated utilities are not related that way (due to inaccuracy in our estimate of the effect set). Due to this factoredness, the FK COIN is equivalent to load balancing on world rewards. Since LB in general results in inferior performance compared to LB over time, and since the FK COIN is equivalent to LB, one might expect that its performance is suboptimal. Intuitively, this suboptimality reflects the fact that one should not choose the action only with regard to its effect on current reward, but also with concern for the reward of future waves. In the language of the COIN framework, this suboptimality can be viewed as a restatement of the fact that for our inexactly estimated effect set, the system will not be perfectly factored.
The learning algorithm of the MB COIN as described is extraordinarily crude. In addition, the associated scheme for choosing an action is purely exploitative, with no exploration whatsoever. Rather than choose some particular more sophisticated scheme and tune it to fit our simulations, we emulated using more sophisticated algorithms in general. We did this by modifying the MB COIN algorithm to occasionally have the FK COIN determine a router's action rather than the purely greedy learner outlined above. The steering parameter discussed in Section 4.5 determines how often the routing decision is based on the MB COIN as opposed to the FK COIN.
SIMULATION RESULTS
Based on the model and routing algorithms discussed above, we have performed simulations to compare the performance of ISPA and MB COIN across a variety of networks, varying in size from five to eighteen nodes. In all cases traffic was inserted into the network in a regular, non-stochastic manner at the sources. The results we report are averaged over 20 runs. We do not report error bars as they are all lower than 0.05.
In Sections 4.1 -4.4 we analyze traffic patterns over four networks where ISPA suffers from the Braess' paradox. In contrast, the MB COIN almost never falls prey to the paradox for those networks (or for no networks we have investigated is the MB COIN significantly susceptible to Braess' paradox). Then in Section 4.5 we discuss the effect on the MB COIN's performance of the "steering" parameter which determines the intelligence of the MB COIN. 9 
Bootes Network
The first network type we investigate is shown in Figure 3 . It is in many senses a trivial network. (Indeed, in Net A, the sources do not even have any choices to make.) The loads introduced at the sources do not change in time and are listed in Tables 1 and 2 , along with the performances of our algorithms.
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Hex Network
In this section we revisit the network first discussed in Section 2.1 (redrawn in Figure 4 to include the dummy nodes). In Table 3 we give full results for the load-to-delay functions discussed in that section. We then use load-to-cost functions which are qualitatively similar to those discussed in Section 2.1, but which incorporate non-linearities that better represent real router characteristics. That load-to-cost function and associated results are reported in Table 4 . This network demonstrates that while the addition of a new link may be beneficial in low traffic cases, it leads to bottlenecks in higher traffic regimes. For ISPA although the per packet cost for loads of 1 and 2 drop drastically when the new link is added, the per packet cost increases for higher loads. The MB COIN on the other hand uses the new link efficiently. Notice that the MB COIN's performance is slightly worse than that of the ISPA in the absence of the additional link. This is caused by the MB COIN having to use a learner to estimate the WLU values for potential actions whereas the ISPA simply has direct access to all the information it needs (costs at each link). 
Butterfly Network
The next network we investigate is shown in Figure 5 . It is an extension to the simple network discussed in Section 4.1. We now have doubled the size of the network and have 
Net A Net B Figure 5 : Butterfly Network Table 5 presents two sets of results: first we present results for uniform traffic through all three sources, and then results for asymmetric traffic. For the first case, the Braess' paradox is apparent in the ISPA: adding the new link is beneficial for the network at low load levels where the average per packet cost is reduced by nearly 20%, but deleterious at higher levels. The MB COIN, on the other hand, provides the benefits of the added link for the low traffic levels, without suffering from deleterious effects at higher load levels.
For the asymmetric traffic patterns, the added link causes a drop in performance for the ISPA, especially for low overall traffic levels. This is not true for the MB COIN. Notice also that in the high, asymmetric traffic regime, the ISPA performs significantly worse than the MB COIN even without the added link, showing that a bottleneck occurs 
Ray Network
In all the networks and traffic regimes discussed so far the sources are the only routers with more than one routing option. The final network we investigate is a larger network where the number of routers with multiply options is significantly higher than in the previous networks. Figure 6 shows the initial network (Net A) and the "augmented" network (Net B), where new links have been added. The original network has relatively few choices for the routers, as packets are directed toward their destinations along "conduits." The new links are added in the augmented networks to provide new choices (crossing patterns) that could be beneficial if certain of the original conduits experience large costs. Table 6 shows the simulation results for these networks (S 1 and S 2 send packets to D 1 and D 2 respectively). At low load levels both the ISPA and the MB COIN use the new links effectively, although the MB COIN performs slightly worse. This is mainly caused by the difficulty encountered by the simple learner (single nearest neighbor algorithm) in quickly learning the traffic patterns in this large network. Unlike the ISPA however, the MB COIN avoids the Braess' paradox in all cases except the very high traffic regime. Moreover, even there, the effect is significantly milder than that encountered by the ISPA. Net A Net B Figure 6 : Ray network Table 6 : Average Per Packet Cost for RAY network for V 1 = 50 + log(1 + x) ; V 2 = 10x ; V 3 = 10 + log(1 + x). 
Steering the MB COIN
The final aspect of COIN-based routing we investigate is the impact of the choice for the value of the steering parameter. This parameter both controls the amount of exploration the algorithm performs and determines the "intelligence" of the MB COIN at estimating the surface directly calculated by the FK COIN. In Figure 7 we provide results when the steering parameter is set to 1.0 so that the MB COIN reduces to FK COIN. This provides an upper bound on the performance that the MB COIN could achieve if it used no exploration.
For the HEX network (Figure 7(a) ), the performance at the worst setting for the MB COIN, which corresponds to no steering, is comparable to ISPA. In contrast, with moderate steering (0.5) the results are similar to that of the FK COIN, as the learner has more information to work with (arising from the extra parts of the input space represented in the training set due to the occasional use of the FK COIN), it bridges the gap between a suboptimal algorithm susceptible to Braess' paradox and one which efficiently avoids that paradox.
For the RAY network (Figure 7(b) ), the value of the steering parameter is more critical. With no steering at all, the MB COIN performs poorly in this network -even worse than ISPA. This is not surprising in that because there are many routing choices that affect the performance, the simple memory-based learner needs proper "seeding" to be able to perform well. In any case, with the addition of steering the MB COIN quickly outperforms the ISPA.
Finally, for both the Butterfly and Bootes networks (Figures 7(c) -7(d) ) the MB COIN needs very little steering to perform well. Although for the Butterfly network the performance of MB COIN improves slightly with more information, it is significantly better than the ISPA across the board.
CONCLUSION
Effective routing in a network is a fundamental problem in many fields, including data communications and transportation. Shortest path algorithms provide an elegant solution to this problem, but under certain circumstances suffer from less than desirable effects. One such effect is Braess' paradox, where increased capacity results in lower overall throughput for shortest path algorithms due to the potentially harmful side-effects of the decisions made by such algorithms. Even a full-blown load-balancing can suffer from such side-effects , since in general they extend across time as well as space, whereas, load balancing ignores temporal side-effects.
Collective Intelligence is a novel way of controlling distributed systems so as to avoid the deleterious side-effects. In a COIN, the central issue is in determining the personal objectives to be assigned to the components of the system. One wants to choose those goals so that the greedy pursuit of those goals by the components of the system leads to a globally desirable solution. We have summarized COIN theory and derived a routing algorithm based on that theory. In our simulations, the ISPA induced average costs as much as 32 % higher than the COIN-based algorithm. This was despite the ISPA's having access to more information than the MB COIN. Furthermore the COIN-based algorithm avoided the Braess' paradoxes that seriously diminished the performance of the ISPA.
In the work presented here, the COIN-based algorithm had to overcome severe limitations. Firstly, the estimation of the effect sets used were exceedingly poor. Secondly, the learners were particularly simple-minded, and therefore were not able to effectively maximize their performance. That a COIN-based router with such serious limitations consistently outperformed an ideal shortest path algorithm demonstrates the strength of the proposed method.
We are currently investigating novel utilities that are more "learnable" for the routers as well as expand the simulations to larger networks using a commercial event driven simulator. Future work will focus on not making the approximation that current traffic levels do not affect future windowed loads (Equation 7). It will also involve investigating better estimates of effect sets, in particular not including all nodes with the same destination in one's effect set, and more generally using a more "fine-grained" representation of the nodes, for example including each packet's originating source, to allow a more fine-grained effect set (and resultant WLU).
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